Fact fiction liquidating loan self minor dating sit
Thoughts on Delaware Amicus Curiae Brief was my first blog post, put up on the same day I submitted that brief to the U. District Court for the District of Delaware (February 2, 2016).
The post had some commentary on aspects of the brief, but its greatest value as a reference was its link to the was written as a rebuttal to arguments made by counsel for Treasury and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in a host of lawsuits filed against the government for its post-conservatorship treatment of Fannie and Freddie.
The Takeover and the Terms (February 23, 2016) compares the mammoth non-cash losses recorded by Fannie and Freddie from 2008 to 2011—which forced them to take 7 billion in non-repayable senior preferred stock from Treasury—with the subsequent spike in their earnings between the fourth quarter of 2012 and the first quarter of 2014.
During those 18 months Fannie and Freddie earned 8 billion, all of which went to Treasury because of the net worth sweep.
That amount was one and a half times the companies’ cumulative earnings in their respective 70 and 38 years of existence, proving irrefutably that their 2008-2011 losses were not real.
Fixing What Works (March 31, 2016) was written in response to a request from the Urban Institute to contribute to its “Housing Finance Reform Incubator” project. I thought, therefore, that this would be a good time to look back on the first year’s inventory of posts with a piece that summarizes them, by category, and also provides links to each for reference purposes.In my second post, Some Context, and the Coming Bailout Charade (February 15, 2016), I stated that the goal of the site was “to improve the quality of information available about the relative merits of various approaches to reforming the U. mortgage finance system,” noting “(t)here is a large amount of misinformation currently being circulated on the subject, which in many cases my background and experience put me in a position to correct.” I’ve worked toward this goal in my first year of the blog.But FHFA also added over 0 billion in non-cash expenses that were outside the scope of the Dodd-Frank test, to produce a headline loss figure of 6 billion (in support of Treasury’s contention that the companies were a “failed business model” that had to be replaced).The media universally reported on the inflated 6 billion loss, while this post addressed the results of the test more objectively and accurately.
Capital Considerations (June 23, 2016) followed “Solving the Wrong Problem” in sequence, and was my attempt to address the capital issue I claimed others had not treated adequately.